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) Case No. 880618 CA 
REPLY BRIEF 
COMES NOW the Defendant/Appellant by and through his 
attorney of record, Daniel R. Knowlton, and hereby submits this 
Reply Brief in response to the matters raised in the brief of 
Relspondent. This brief responds to only certain matters raised 
by the State, which it is felt require a response. Most matters 
were adequately handled in the Appellants brief, and therefore 
will not be commented on herein. 
POINT I: THAT EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH 
WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE 
The finding that Defendant possessed just over one ounce of 
marijuana within 1000 feet of a public school cannot be upheld as 
it was based on evidence from an improperly issued search 
warrant. The "totality-of-the-circumstances" must be considered 
to see whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant meets 
the probable cause standard. In St.at.e_x- A,£S.Ll# 7 62 P. 2d 1107 
(Utah 1988), the Court of Appeals of Utah stated, at 1109: 
"Factors to be considered include, among others, the 
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of 
confidential informants, and whether the judicial officer 
issuing the warrant reached a practical, common sense 
decision. State v.Jansen, 732 P. 2d 127 (Utah 1987). The 
weight accorded these factors may vary according to the 
circumstances. SJtate v.. BajJ^ ey, 675 P. 2d 1203 (Utah 1984)." 
In Ayala, id., at 1110, the drug buy occurred within seven 
days of the affidavit, and in issuing the search warrant the 
"magistrate had available the firsthand observations of the 
affiant, an experience narcotics officer." In the case at bar, 
the Affidavit for Search Warrant (Appendix "A" to Brief of 
Respondent, hereinafter referred to as "Affidavit") shows that 
all the percipient testimony (other that the testimony that one 
who occasionally smokes marijuana will retain possession of pipes 
for up to several years, id.) is based entirely on secondhand 
information from a Ms. Heber. 
In State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, at 1366, (Utah 1987), the 
Court of Appeals of Utah stated, at 1366: 
"Although no longer a required test under the Gates 
standard, the veracity or reliability of an informant is 
still a relevant consideration when reviewing the totality 
of the circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 
2328; see also State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 
1987). However, the average neighbor witness is not the 
type of informant in need of independent proof of 
reliability or veracity." 
The credibility of the then fifteen-year-old Ms. Heber was 
not checked although Chief Gardner was aware that she was seeing 
a psychiatrist for stress as well as group therapy at school 
(reporter's transcript of defendant's motion to suppress 
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evidence, hereinafter referred to as Tr. Ms., pp. 54-5), and as 
such was much less reliable than the average neighbor witness. 
She had seen the defendant smoke marijuana, but she had never 
seen him smoking marijuana in the house (Tr. Ms. p. 20), nor seen 
drugs in the house (Tr. Ms. p. 25), and had seen marijuana pipes 
in three locations one and one half years previous to the police 
interview. (Tr. Ms. p. 27.) It is questionable whether she could 
distinguish a marijuana pipe from other pipes. 
Furthermore, none of the percipient testimony of Ms. Heber 
is couched in present-tense language (Affidavit), but is all 
remarkably past tense. The information was stale. 
In United States v. Craig, 674 P Supp 561 (WD La, 1987), it 
is stated that where the affidavit on which the search warrant is 
based describes the offense as having occurred within a certain 
time period but without specifying dates (for example, during 
past six months) the court reviewing the question of staleness of 
information must presume that the transactions took place in the 
most remote part of the time span, otherwise any ancient evidence 
could be used by merely describing it as falling within a period 
of time ending with the current date. Under this sensible 
analysis, the testimony in the Affidavit at hand would be that 
marijuana was smoked one and one half years ago, the pipes had 
been seen one and one half years ago, and that one pipe had been 
seen over two months before the Affidavit was signed (Affidavit). 
This staleness must be considered with the other weaknesses in 
evaluating the totality of the circumstances. 
The State argues that this was a continuing endeavor, to 
mitigate the obvious staleness. First, they argue it was 
"commenced on February 14, 1980" (Brief of Respondent, p. 11), 
merely because of a marijuana possession conviction then. 
Despite the obvious, that the facts justifying a conviction 
may've occurred long before the date of conviction, the issuing 
magistrate would have to conclude there was a six-year-plus gap 
between this conviction and any evidence of marijuana involvement 
(from February 14, 1980, to date of the Affidavit, May 20, 1988, 
less the testified-to one and one half years prior to May 20, 
1988.) The magistrate could not reasonably have found a 
continuous activity in the face of this minimum six and a half 
year gap. This itself is evidence of isolated occurrences. Were 
all this sufficient to justify a warrant, a man who'd smoked 
marijuana six or seven years ago, if he were seen with what could 
be an exotic tobacco pipe in the past year or two, would be 
subject to search and siezure anytime, any place, since an expert 
could opine, as did Officer Brian (see Affidavit), that he likely 
retains the paraphernalia for up to several years. 
The State's argument that staleness does not occur because 
"the business of dealing in illegal drugs is ordinarily a 
regenerating activity" (Brief of Respondent, p. 10), is 
inappropriate. The Affidavit states not a scintilla of evidence 
that Defendant was engaged in drug sales, and the cases cited 
under that argument are accordingly misplaced. A few usages of 
marijuana over one and one half years are not tantmount to the 
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continuous activities of cultivating growing plants (Brief of 
Respondent, p. 9)--plants do not grow only on isolated days--
loansharking operations, nor drug-smuggling operations (id. at p. 
10). 
The State has made no serious attempt to rebut the facts 
that the search was completely pretextual. Nor can they, since 
Mr, Andrus, Davis County Attorney's Office, testified that what 
was really sought was not just the pipes (the only thing 
testified to in the Affidavit to be at the house, per the 
Affidavit), but controlled substances (see eg. Record, p. 85). 
Mr. Andrus knew they did not have information that the defendant 
was a drug dealer, but they hoped by this to be able to develop 
some information later and get a second search warrant, which 
they attempted to do. (See eg. Tr. Ms. p. 187-8.) The fact the 
warrant is pretextual should overcome any grounds of "good 
faith". 
On this skimpy and dilatory basis, the warrant issued, 
describing, in an omnibus way, not "marijuana" nor, most 
accurately, "pipes", but "controlled substances", "records", 
"accounts", etc. (see Search Warrant, attached to Brief of 
Respondent) for the latter of which, paticularly, there was no 
evidentiary basis whatsoever. The only attack in the State's 
brief on the fact the warrant was pretextual, was to state an 
absence of legal authority in the Appellant's brief. The area 
where pretextual search is most noticeably encountered is in 
pretextual traffic stops. If an arrest for a traffic violation 
is a mere pretext for an exploratory search, the search will not 
be sustained. United States v,Jones 452 F2d 884 (CA8 Mo). 
McReynolds v. State 441 So2d 1016 (Ala App 1983) (traffic officer 
with knowledge defendant's license had been suspended one year 
earlier could not stop automobile and ask to see operator's 
license as ruse in intended search for some possible crime). 
People v. Wetherbe 122 111 App 3d 654 (1984), 78 111 Dec 285, 462 
NE2d 1 (inventory of trunk of vehicle held to be a sham where 
deputy had acted pursuant to investigatory motive). 
Considered altogether, the totality of the circumstances 
shows a warrant which should've been limited to pipes, if at all, 
issued on grounds insufficient by reason of a six-year-plus gap, 
unreliable, and stale. 
POINT II: THAT A CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT FOR FELONY 
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA IS AN UNREASONABLE AND 
UNCONSTITUTION DEFINITION OF A CRIME 
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-8(5)(a)(i) through (iii) 
provides enhancement to a felony if the specific act was 
committed: 
M(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary 
school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, 
or other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the 
act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a 
school under Subsection (5)(a)(i); 
(iii) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii);"... 
Lacking a nexus, or causal connection, between the act 
occurring within that distance from a school activity or 
property, and resulting detriment to those schoolchildren, the 
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statute violates due process, denies equal protection to those 
living within the prescribed distance, and constitutes an 
impermissable irrebutable presumption. 
With regard to due process, that the statutory enhancement 
is arbitrary and capricious in this case is easily seen. First, 
possession, without any proof of any intent, or attempt, to sell 
or distribute, or any actual relationship to the school, is 
without effect on the school. It is telling on this point that 
the Federal cases cited by Respondent, upholding the distance 
distinction from school grounds, State v. Jones, 77 9 F.2d 121 
(2nd Cir. 1985, United Statesv. Nieves, 608 F.Supp 1147 
(D.C.N.Y. 1985), United States v. Cunningham, 615 F.Supp 519 
(D.C.N.Y. 1985), and United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215 
(D.C. Cir. 1987), are cases involving dilaudid, heroin or cocaine 
sale or distribution. None stood on mere possession, much less 
of marijuana. 
These Federal cases are likewise illustrative of the danger 
of such prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutor, armed with the 
enhancement statute, may easily treat mere possession nearly as 
seriously as sale. These Federal cases should have no binding 
authority under the Utah Constitution Art. 1, Section 7, due 
process provision, and it is submitted the application of this 
enhancement statute to simple possession of marijuana, in a 
private home, without evidence of intent to or attempt to sell, 
and without proof of the possession proximately causing detriment 
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to a local school, violates the Utah due process clause, as well 
as the Federal. 
Subsection (5)(a)(ii) of the statute applies enhancement to 
acts (coupled with Subsection (5)(a)(iii)) within 1,000 feet of 
any structure, facility, or grounds being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school. Undoubtedly, if a school 
acquires a property and builds a school nearby a home where a 
person has long before stored an ounce of marijuana under lock 
and key, an enhancement will be said to occur under the statute. 
Certainly then, every premises or building visited by every 
capricious school-sponsored field trip becomes a transient 
nucleus of a temporary zone 2,000 feet wide. Perhaps, since 
schoolbussing is a sponsored activity, every premises a schoolbus 
stops at becomes a momentary nucleus of the prohibited zone. 
Further, if it is recognized that homes are closer together, and 
schools nearer, in racially- and poverty-mixed central cities, 
the statutory enhancement is visited more harshly upon those 
residents. 
It can be seen from the fact of the enhancement that a 
legislative presumption has been made that drug acts occurring 
within 1,000 feet of a school are irrebuttably deemed to be more 
culpable, as injurious to schoolchildren. Hence any such act is 
enhanced to a felony. In .Cojiri.ty. C^urt^gf ^  AlJ.en, 
60 L Ed 2d 777, 99 S Ct 2213 (1978) (citing as precedent ToJLjLi 
United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1942), Leary v. United States, 3 95 
U.S. 6 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a 
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criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as irrational or 
arbitrary, and hence unconstitutional for purposes of due 
process, unless it can at least be said with substantial 
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow 
from the proved fact on which it is made to depend. That case 
involved the statutory presumtion that the presence of a firearm 
in an automobile is generally presumptive evidence of its illegal 
possession by all persons then occupying the vehicle. The court 
analyzed that the jury could reasonably conclude the guns found 
across an open handbag of a sixteen-year-old girl were more than 
likely in the possession of the other occupants of the vehicle, 
too, three grown men. Noteworthy is the fact the court analyzed 
the presumption on the frame of the specific facts of that case, 
not merely in the abstract. 
Applying that same analysis to our statutory presumption, on 
our specific facts, for the statute to be valid, it must be more 
likely than not that one ounce of marijuana possessed in a 
private dwelling, with no evidence of intent to sell or 
distribute, nor attempt to sell or distribute, and no evidence 
even of usage of the marijuana, is more likely than not to 
detrimentally affect a school located within 1,000 feet. On 
these facts, it is illogical to assume anything or any person 
affiliated with the school had the slightest impact with the 
storage of the small amount, and hence the statute is arbitrary 
and capricious if applied here. At the least, the court should 
conclude that for the enhancement to be upheld, a nexus must be 
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proven, beyond simple possession, and that applied to simple 
possession of marijuana in a private dwelling, without more, the 
statute is capricious. 
Coming back to the issue of prosecutorial discretion, 
Appellant notes that Slate v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), 
22 Utah 2d 343, at 346, stands for the proposition that where 
there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is 
applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of 
the lesser. This case was distinguished from SJtaLfe^ ^ 
753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988). Considering the vast portion of cities 
affected by the proximity to school activities (not just 
property), the charging authorities of prosecutors under the 
statute is too broad. 
CONCLUSION 
The matters asserted herein are in response to certain 
matters raised in the brief of the State, and do not waive nor 
diminish the points raised and argued in Appellant's brief. It is 
respectfully submitted that the evidence obtained pursuant to the 
search warrant was improperly admitted into evidence, upon the 
basis that probable cause was lacking for the issuance of the 
warrant, that the warrant was pretextual, over broad on its face, 
and based on stale information. Furthermore, it is submitted the 
enhancement statute is an unconstitutional violation of 
Appellant's due process rights. Appellant requests that this 
Court reverse his conviction and remand the matter for future 
proceedings in accordance with the points and requests in 
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Defendant/Appellant's brief, with the instruction that, absent a 
further nexus between the school and the possession, a felony 
conviction cannot be obtained. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of July, 1989 
Daniel R. Knowlton 
Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the ^ I day of July, 1989, four 
true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY teRIEF were 
delivered to Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, 2^ 6/ State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
11 
APPENDIX A 
MELVIN C. WILSON 3513 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-3227 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
In Re: Search of the 
premises described as ; 
1487 South 1250 West, 
Syracuse, Davis County, Utah, : 
a single-family dwelling. 
: AFFIDAVIT FOR 
: SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss: 
Before Alfred C. VanWagenen, Circuit Court Judge, the 
undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has 
probable cause to believe that on the premises which are 
described as: 
1487 South 1250 West 
Syracuse, Davis County, Utah, 
A single-family dwelling 
there is now certain property described as: 
Controlled substances, 
Drug paraphernalia, 
Identification cards, records, accounts, 
books, pictures, receipts, personal 
property or other items evidencing 
ownership, occupation or control of the 
above premises or rooms therein. 
•rne racts to establish the issuance of this warrant are 
as follows: 
1. Affiant is a peace officer employed by Syracuse city 
and is involved in the investigation of an illegal sexual act 
alleged to have been committed by Lane Stromberg. 
2. On the 25th of April, 1988# a 15 year old girl stated 
to affiant that she was acquainted with Lane Stromberg, an adult 
male, and that she had had sexual intercourse with Stromberg at 
his residence at 1487 South 1250 West in Syracuse, Utah, during 
the first week of March, 1988. The girl stated that this 
occurred in an upstairs bedroom. 
3. The 15 year old girl stated that she has been to 
Stromberg's home several times in the past year and a half, as 
she is a close friend to Stromberg's own teen age daughter. 
During that time, the 15 year old said she has seen Stromberg 
smoking marijuana three or four times. She has seen various 
marijuana pipes lying around the house in various locations 
including on the bookshelf of Stromberg's water bed in his 
bedroom, in the kitchen area of the home, and in the room where 
Stromberg keeps his personal computer, in the basement. The last 
time she saw a marijuana pipe at his residence was the first week 
of March, 1988. She has not been in the home since then. 
4. Affiant believes the girl is giving reliable 
information. Affiant has verified with a school counselor that 
the girl and Stromberg's daughter are good friends and that the 
girl has no juvenile court record. Furthermore affiant has 
checked Lane Stromberg's criminal record, which shows a 
conviction for possession of marijuana dated February 14, 1980. 
5. Affiant has spoken to Lon Brian, an undercover 
narcotics officer employed by the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike 
Force. Officer Brian has received training from the federal DEA 
regarding drugs and undercover drug operations, has worked for 
nearly three years as an undercover narcotics officer, and has 
witnessed thousands of drug transactions involving the use, 
possession, and sales of controlled substances. 
6. Officer Brian is familiar with the facts of this 
case. Based on his training and experience, a person who 
occasionally smokes marijuana in his own home retains possession 
of the pipes or other paraphernalia for long periods of time, up 
to several years. 
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued 
for the search of the above-described premises and the seizure 
of any of the said items. 
Afffiar|t 
Subscribed and sworn to me this ^O day of May, 1988. 
QzfJ c tfc id 
C i r c u i t /(court Judge 
**^\» 
